Mechanisms to Meet/Beat Analyst Earnings Expectations in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Eras by Bartov, Eli & Cohen, Daniel A.
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
NYU Center for Law, Economics and Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mechanisms to Meet/Beat Analyst Earnings Expectations 
in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Eras  
 
 
 
Eli Bartov and Daniel A. Cohen 
 
 
 
May 2007 
 
 
 
LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 
WORKING PAPER NO. 07-18 
 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=954857 
 
MECHANISMS TO MEET/BEAT ANALYST  
EARNINGS EXPECTATIONS IN THE PRE-  
AND POST-SARBANES-OXLEY ERAS* 
 
 
 
 
 
Eli Bartov  
 
Daniel A. Cohen** 
 
 
New York University 
Leonard N. Stern School of Business 
44 West 4th St. 
New York, NY 10012 
 
 
 
April 25, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*We thank Yoel Beniluz, Larry Brown, Valentin Dimitrov, Kim Dunn, Richard Frankel, Ohad 
Kadan, Jim Ohlson, Tzachi Zach and the seminar participants at the NYU doctoral seminar, 
Georgia State University, Rutgers University, and Washington University in St. Louis for useful 
comments and suggestions. 
** Corresponding author, (212) 998 0267, dcohen@stern.nyu.edu
MECHANISMS TO MEET/BEAT ANALYST  
EARNINGS EXPECTATIONS IN THE PRE-  
AND POST-SARBANES-OXLEY ERAS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper asks two questions.  First, has the prevalence of expectations management to 
meet/beat analyst expectations changed in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 accounting 
scandals and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)?  Second, has the mix 
among the three mechanisms used for meeting earnings targets: accrual earnings 
management, real earnings management, and earnings expectations management shifted 
in the Post-SOX Period?  We document that the propensity to meet/beat analyst 
expectations has declined significantly in the Post-SOX Period.  Our primary findings 
explain this pattern.  In particular, we find a decline in the use of expectations 
management and accrual management, and no change in real earnings management in the 
Post-SOX Period relative to the preceding seven-year period.  Our results are robust to 
controlling for varying macro economic conditions.  These findings contribute to the 
academic literature, investors, and regulators. 
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 MECHANISMS TO MEET/BEAT ANALYST  
EARNINGS EXPECTATIONS IN THE PRE-  
AND POST-SARBANES-OXLEY ERAS 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The accounting literature has documented that companies employ a variety of 
strategies to meet or beat analyst earnings expectations.  One strategy concerns taking 
accounting actions, also known as accrual-based earnings management (e.g., Dhaliwal et 
al. 2004).  A second strategy involves taking real economic actions, also known as real or 
transaction-based earnings management (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006).  A third strategy 
relates to managing analyst earnings expectations (e.g., Bartov et al. 2002). 
 The purpose of this study is twofold.  The first is to test for any change in the 
prevalence of earnings expectations management following the major accounting 
scandals of 2001-2002 at Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing, to name just a few, 
and the new requirements introduced by the 2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX).  The 
second purpose is to test for a blend shift in the Post-SOX Period among the three 
mechanisms used for meeting or beating analyst earnings targets: accrual earnings 
management, real earnings management, and earnings expectations management. 
 The aftermath of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on July 30, 2002, 
changed the financial reporting environment significantly.  Specifically, Section 201 of 
SOX prohibits outside auditors from providing nine nonaudit services to their audit 
clients (e.g., bookkeeping, appraisals, actuarial services, and investment-advisory work), 
and requires that other nonaudit services (e.g., tax services) be approved in advance by 
the audit committee.  These measures should increase auditors’ independence and thus 
result in higher quality of the audit reports.  In addition, companies must provide in their 
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annual reports an assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls for financial 
reporting (Section 404), and CEOs/CFOs must certify under oath annual and quarterly 
reports (Section 302) and are subject to significant penalties for false certification 
(Section 906).  These measures should further deter management from fraudulent 
financial reporting.  Given this, we expect accrual earnings management in general and to 
meat/beat analysts’ earnings expectations in particular to decline in the Post-SOX 
period.1 
With respect to changes in expectations management and real earnings 
management our predictions are not straightforward.  Earnings expectations management 
may decrease or increase in the Post-SOX Period.  It may decrease as a result of the 
significant attention earnings expectations management received from the academic 
literature (e.g., Bartov et al. 2002), the financial press (e.g., McGee 1997), and regulators 
(e.g., Levitt 1998) in the period leading to the passage of SOX.  Still, expectations 
management may increase due to a substitution effect (e.g., Zang 2005).  Indeed, Koh et 
al. (2006) document an increase in expectations management in the Post-SOX Period, 
and conjecture that managers substitute accrual management with expectations 
management in that period.  
Real earnings management to meet/beat analyst earnings expectations is not 
expected to decline in the Post-SOX Period because auditors are unlikely to question this 
type of activity.  For example, according to CFOs interviewed by Graham et al. (2005, p. 
36), auditors “cannot readily challenge real economic actions to meet earnings targets 
that are taken in ordinary course of action.”  Should we expect an increase in real 
                                                 
1 Two points to note:  (1) Statement on Auditing Standard No. 99 guides auditors to consider the frequency 
a firm meets earnings expectations when evaluating the risks of fraudulent financial reporting; (2) 
throughout the paper we use the term Post-Scandal Period and Post-SOX Period interchangeably.  
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earnings management in the Post-SOX Period?  The answer to this question is largely 
empirical as two conflicting forces may be at work and it is not clear which one 
dominates.  On one hand, the substitution effect (e.g., Cohen et al. 2006) suggests real 
earnings management will increase to compensate for the decreases in expectations 
management and accrual management.  On the other hand, according to Zang (2005), 
managers employ earnings management strategies sequentially, i.e., they select real 
manipulation before resorting to accrual manipulation.  This raises the possibility that 
real manipulation opportunities might have been exhausted in the Pre-Scandal Period, 
and thus no increase in that activity should be expected in the Post-Scandal Period 
notwithstanding the decreases in earnings and expectations management. 
Like related research (Koh et al. 2006) we find that the frequency of just 
meeting/beating analyst earnings expectations diminished in the Post-SOX period and 
similar to Cohen et al. (2006) and Lobo and Zhou (2006) we find that accrual earnings 
management has increased over time prior to the passage of SOX and has decreased 
significantly thereafter.  More importantly, we find what has not been documented 
before.  First, the propensity to manage analyst earnings expectations to meet/beat 
earnings expectations, which has increased over time prior to SOX, has significantly 
decreased in the Post-SOX period.  Second and more important, the mix among the three 
mechanisms used to meet/beat earnings expectations, accrual management, expectations 
management, and real earnings management, has changed significantly in the Post-SOX 
period.  Specifically, we find a decline in the use of expectations management and 
accrual management but no change in real earnings management in the Post-SOX period 
to meet/beat earnings expectations.  This last result, which is robust to specifications that 
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consider changes in macro-economic variables, is important because it explains the 
observed decline in the tendency to meet/beat analyst earnings expectations in the Post-
SOX period. 
Our findings make two specific contributions.  First, they contribute to the extant 
academic literature on the earnings expectations game.  Our results suggest that 
expectations management has decreased rather than increased in the Post-SOX period.  
Second and more importantly, while related research demonstrates the frequency of just 
meeting/beating analyst expectations diminishing in the Post-SOX period our results 
explain this finding.  By being the first to simultaneously consider all three mechanisms 
used to meet/beat analysts’ expectations, we show that accrual earnings management and 
expectations management both declined, whereas real earnings management remained 
unchanged.  This change in the relative importance of the three mechanisms implies that 
in the Post-SOX period investors should pay more attention to real earnings management 
than in the Pre-SOX period.  It also implies that regulators should enhance scrutiny of the 
reported results from these transactions (e.g., to ensure correct classification on the 
income statement), and perhaps require companies to provide better disclosures of results 
from such activities.2 
The next section surveys extant literature on mechanisms to meet/beat analyst 
earnings expectations and contrasts it with our work.  Section III outlines the sample 
selection procedure, defines the varibles, and describes the data.  Section IV outlines the 
tests and reports the results.  The final section summarizes our main findings and states 
our conclusions. 
                                                 
2 For example, in 1999 IBM recorded a pre-tax gain of $4,057 million from disposition of a variety of 
assets as a reduction of selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expense, rather than as a special gain 
above the line. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Earnings management to influence accounting appearances has been drawing 
substantial attention from accounting researchers for decades.  While early studies have 
sought to document the existence of real earnings management (e.g., Bartov 1993) and 
accrual earnings management (e.g., McNichols and Wilson 1998; DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1994), more recent studies investigated a new form of management, earnings 
expectations management (e.g., Bartov et al. 2002).  Generally, these studies 
demonstrated that companies use all three mechanisms to meet earnings benchmarks. 
Related studies also investigated a possible substitution effect between accrual 
earnings management and real earnings management.  Zang (2005) investigates whether 
managers use real and accrual manipulations in managing earnings as substitutes, and 
also the order in which these mechanisms are employed.  She finds that there is a 
substitution effect between the two and that managers employ these strategies 
sequentially, i.e., they select real earnings manipulation before resorting to accrual 
manipulation.  Cohen et al. (2006) document generally without reference to any particular 
earnings target that accrual earnings management increased steadily in the Pre-SOX 
period, but decreased significantly thereafter, while real earnings management declined in 
the Pre-SOX period and increased significantly in the Post-SOX period.  They interpret 
their results as suggesting that firms switched from accrual to real earnings management 
in the Post-SOX period, a behavior consistent with the substitution effect found by Zang 
(2005). 
Koh et al. (2006) also test for a possible substitution effect in the Post-SOX 
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period between mechanisms affecting accounting appearances.  Their approach differs 
from that of Cohen et al. (2006) in two ways.  First, they investigate the substitution 
between accrual management and earnings expectations management to meet analysts’ 
expectations; however, they do not investigate the role of real earnings management to 
meet/beat earnings targets.  Second, they focus on accrual management to meet a 
particular earnings benchmark, analysts’ earnings expectations, while Cohen et al. have 
not considered explicitly any specific earnings benchmark.  Koh et al. (2006) find that the 
mix between the two mechanisms used to meet analysts’ expectations they investigated – 
discretionary accruals and earnings expectations management – has changed in the Post-
SOX period.  While managers’ reliance on income-increasing discretionary accruals has 
declined, the frequency of forecast walk-downs (earnings expectations management) has 
increased in the Post-SOX period.  This last result seems disconcerting in light of the 
increased attention earnings expectations management received from the academic 
literature, the financial press, and regulators in the Pre-Scandal and Scandal periods, and 
the corporate governance improvements introduced by SOX.3 
Finally, Graham et al. (2005), in their survey study, report “strong evidence” that 
managers engage in real management activities to meet accounting targets.  In particular, 
80% of survey participants report that they would decrease discretionary spending on 
R&D, advertising, and maintenance to meet an earnings benchmark.  More than half state 
that they would delay starting a new project to meet an earnings target, even if such a 
delay entailed a small sacrifice in value.  They observe that (p. 36) “the aftermath of 
accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom and the certification requirements imposed 
                                                 
3 We define the Scandal period as beginning in the third quarter of 2001 and lasting through the second 
quarter of 2002. 
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by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act may have changed managers’ preferences for the mix 
between taking accounting versus real actions to manage earnings,” but provide little 
empirical evidence to support this statement. 
 In summary, related research documented an increase in real earnings 
management and a decrease in accrual earnings management in a setting where a 
particular earnings target was not specified, and a decrease in accrual management and 
increase in earnings expectations management in a setting where meeting analyst 
earnings expectations was the specific earnings target. 
We address two research questions left unanswered by prior research.  First, we 
test for a change in the prevalence of expectations management to meet or beat earnings 
expectations between the Pre- and Post-SOX periods (our first hypothesis).  By carefully 
measuring expectations management and by dividing our sample period into four 
subperiods, instead of three, we are able to demonstrate that expectations management 
diminished rather than increased in the Post-SOX period. 
Second and more important, we document a decline in the frequency of just 
meeting/beating analyst earnings expectations in the Post-SOX period, and then in an 
attempt to explain this decline test simultaneously for a shift in the mix among the three 
mechanisms used to just meet or beat earnings expectations, accrual earnings 
management, real earnings management, and earnings expectations management.  We 
hypothesize that accrual management has decreased, earnings expectations management 
may have increased or decreased, and real earnings management may have increased  or 
remained unchanged between the Late Pre- and Post SOX periods (our second 
hypothesis).  By considering all three mechanisms simultaneously, our results are able to 
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explain the observed decline in the tendency to just meet/beat analysts’ expectations 
observed in the Post-SOX period. 
 
III. DATA 
Sample Selection 
We obtain our data from the COMPUSTAT quarterly files and the I/B/E/S detail 
files.  In order to be included in our sample, a firm-quarter observation must first satisfy 
the following three criteria:4 
1. There exist at least two individual earnings forecasts (not necessarily by the 
same individual analyst) for the quarter, which are at least 20 trading days 
apart. 
2. The release date of the first earnings forecast we use occurs at least three 
trading days after the release of the previous quarter’s earnings report. 
3. The release date of the second earnings forecast we use precedes the release of 
the current quarter’s earnings report by at least three trading days. 
The first criterion ensures that there is an initial forecast and a subsequent forecast 
revision.  These are required to be separated in time by at least 20 days so that the second 
forecast is more likely to represent a true revision reflecting news arriving to the market 
after the initial forecast was issued.  The purpose of the second criterion is to prevent 
‘‘stale’’ forecasts (i.e., those that are not revised following the previous quarter’s 
earnings announcement) from being included in the analysis.  The third criterion ensures 
that the latest forecast is not ‘‘contaminated’’ by knowledge of the actual earnings 
number.  The total number of firm-quarter observations meeting the above three criteria 
                                                 
4 These selection criteria are consistent with previous research (e.g., Bartov et al. 2002). 
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is 245,113 spanning the period from January 1987 to December 2005, representing 
11,061 distinct firms.  We refer to this sample as the I/B/E/S Sample. 
Tests in the second part of our analysis concerning accruals earnings management 
and real earnings management require financial statement information in addition to the 
I/B/E/S data.  For these tests we impose on our sample firms three more restrictions: 
1. The required financial statement information is available on the quarterly 
COMPUSTAT database.   
2. The firm does not belong to one of the following three industries: financial 
institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4800-4999), or other 
regulated industries (SIC codes 4000-4499). 
3. The quarterly earnings surprise relative to the latest analyst earnings forecast 
is non-negative. 
Similar to previous studies, we imposed the second and third criteria, respectively, 
because the empirical models we use to estimate accruals and real earnings management 
do not apply to firms in these industries and because the second set of tests focuses on 
firms that meat or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts.  The intersection of these criteria 
yields a second sample (the Merged Sample) of 84,754 firm-quarter observations, 
representing 6,228 distinct firms. 
 
Variable Definitions 
In order to measure the revision in the analyst earnings forecasts, REV, we 
identify the first forecast and the last forecast for the quarter.  The earliest earnings 
forecast for the quarter, Fearliest, is the first forecast for the quarter made subsequent to the 
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announcement of the previous quarter’s earnings.5  The latest forecast for the quarter, 
Flatest, is the last forecast for the quarter made prior to the release of the earnings 
announcement for that quarter.  REV is the difference between the latest earnings forecast 
and the earliest earnings forecast.  The earnings surprise for the quarter, SURP, is defined 
as the difference between the actual earnings per share number and the latest forecast for 
the quarter, EPS - Flatest, both taken from I/B/E/S.  Earnings forecast error for the quarter 
is the difference between the actual earnings per share number and the earliest forecast 
for the quarter, EPS - Fearliest.  To avoid classification errors, we used the unadjusted (for 
stock dividends and split) analyst earnings forecast per share and unadjusted reported 
earnings per share to compute the earnings surprise and earnings forecast error, both 
taken from I/B/E/S. 
Meeting/Beating analyst earnings expectations is defined as a zero or positive 
(non-negative) earnings surprise, which is the difference between the actual earnings and 
the latest forecast for the quarter, SURP = EPS - Flatest ≥0.  Just meeting/beating analyst 
earnings expectations are firm-quarters observations for which the earnings surprise 
exceeds analysts’ expectations by a cent per share or less, i.e., $0.00 ≤ SURP ≤  $0.01.   
 
Accrual Management Proxy 
We use a cross-sectional model of discretionary accruals, where for each quarter 
we estimate the model for every industry classified by its 2 digit SIC code.  We estimate 
the model cross-sectionally to control for industry-wide changes in economic conditions 
that affect total accruals and allow the coefficients to vary across time (Kasznik 1999; 
                                                 
5 We did not consider earnings forecasts for the current quarter made prior to the release of the previous 
quarter’s earnings report since their subsequent revision is likely to be correlated with the content of this 
report rather than with new information about the current quarter’s results. 
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DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). 
Our primary model is the modified cross-sectional Jones model (Jones 1991) as 
described in Dechow et al. (1995), applied for quarterly data.  The modified Jones model 
is estimated for each 2 digit SIC-quarter grouping as follows: 
εββα jq
jq
jq
jq
jq
jqjq
jq
Asset
PPE
Asset
Sales
AssetAsset
TA ++Δ+=
−−−− 1
2
1
1
1
0
1
)(1               (1) 
Where: 
TAjq  total accruals, defined as earnings minus cash flow for firm j in quarter q; 
Ajq  total assets for firm j in quarter q; 
Sales jqΔ  change in sales for firm j in quarter q; 
AR jqΔ  change in accounts receivables for firm j in quarter q; 
PPEjq  gross property, plant, and equipment for firm j in quarter q; 
We use current cash flows from operations, excluding extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (CFO), to calculate accruals.  The industry-quarter specific 
parameters obtained from equation (1) are used to estimate firm-quarter specific 
nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) as a percent of lagged total assets, adjusting for the 
change in receivables, AR jqΔ , (Dechow et al. 1995): 
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Our measure of discretionary accruals, DA, is the difference between 
Asset
TA
jq
jq
1−
and NDAjq .  
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Real Earnings Management Proxies 
 One proxy for real earnings management is abnormal gain on asset sales, which is 
the difference between the actual gains on asset sales minus the industry-quarter median 
gain.6 
 A second proxy is abnormal level of production costs, defined as the residual 
from the following cross-sectional regression estimated quarterly for each 2 digit SIC 
code: 
 εββαδ jq
jq
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1
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1
0
1
)(1        (3) 
Where: 
PROD jq  is the sum of costs of goods sold and the change in inventories for firm j in 
quarter q; and the other variables are as in Equation (1). 
 The third empirical proxy for real earnings management is abnormal SG&A 
expenses, defined as the residual from the following cross-sectional regression estimated 
quarterly for each 2 digit SIC code: 
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 As an overall proxy for real earnings management activities, we add the three 
variables (which are all defined as a percentage of total assets).7 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the I/B/E/S Sample (Panel A) and for the 
                                                 
6 Quarterly gains from asset sales are Compustat quarterly data item #102, multiplied by (-1).  We multiply 
this by (-1) since Compustat reports losses as a positive numbers for gain or losses from the sale of assets. 
7 We also used standardized residuals and summed them up and repeated the analysis.  The results are not 
sensitive to this alternative method.  
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Merged Sample (Panel B).  Similar to findings in previous studies, the results in Panel A 
show that our sample firms are more likely to deliver a positive earnings surprise than a 
negative one.  Specifically, while 65.3 percent of firm-quarters meat or beat analysts’ 
earnings expectations, only 34.6 percent miss expectations.  In addition, firms are more 
likely to exhibit a negative forecast error (42.9 percent of firm-quarters) than a negative 
earnings surprise (34.6 percent).  Such difference is an indication of earnings 
expectations management, as it is likely achieved by talking-down expectations.  The 
observed negative forecast revision (mean = -0.112) is a further indication of earnings 
expectations management, as in the absence of such activity the average revision is 
expected to be zero, not negative.  The results also show that the mean, median, 25 
percentile, and 75 percentile of firm-size (market capitalization) are, respectively (in 
$million), 2,851.44, 395.666, 125.164 and 1,389.26.  This indicates that our I/B/E/S 
sample contains a wide range of firm sizes.   
 Like the results in Panel A, the results in Panel B show that the Merged Sample is 
also well diversified in terms of firm-size, and that the two samples are quite similar in 
terms of this variable.  The results also demonstrate that the variables underlying the 
estimation of our earnings management proxies, discretionary accruals, inventory 
changes, gains on assets sales, and SG&A, all scaled by lagged total assets, posses well-
behaved properties.  That is, their distributions are symmetric around the mean and an 
outlying-observations problem is not a serious problem. 
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IV. TESTS AND RESULTS 
Subperiod Analyzed 
We partition our sample period into four subperiods (see figure 1).  The first 
subperiod analyzed is the Early Pre-Accounting Scandal period extending from the 
beginning of the sample period (January 1987) through the end of 1993.  The second 
subperiod is the Late Pre-Accounting Scandal period from the beginning of 1994 through 
the second quarter of 2001.  The third subperiod is the Scandal period, from the 
beginning of third quarter of 2001 through the second quarter of 2002, and the fourth 
subperiod is the Post-SOX (Post-Scandal) period, from the beginning of the third quarter 
of 2002 through the end of our sample period (December 2005). 
Related research (e.g., Koh et al. 2006) partitioned their sample period into only 
three subperiods:  The pre-Scandal period, the Scandal period, and the Post-SOX (Post 
Scandal) period.  We further partition the Pre-Scandal Period into two periods, the Early 
and Late Pre-Scandal periods, because findings in prior research (e.g., Bartov et al. 2002, 
and Brown and Caylor 2005), as well as anecdotal evidence, suggest there was a 
substantial increase in the use of analysts’ estimates as a benchmark for firm performance 
and in the prevalence of the “expectations game” in the mid-1990s.8  For the purpose of 
testing our two hypotheses, the two subperiods of interest are thus the Late Pre-Scandal 
period and the Post-SOX period. 
 
Changes in Expectations Management 
Our first set of tests for a change in earnings expectations management in the 
                                                 
8 Several sources began providing earnings benchmarks based on analysts’ forecasts on the Internet only in 
the mid-1990s.  Perhaps the best known, First Call, introduced its service to the web in 1994.  
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Post-SOX period (our first hypothesis) concerns examining the role interim analyst 
forecast revisions plays in affecting the sign of the end-of-quarter earnings surprise.  To 
increase power, we restrict the analysis to a subsample consisting of firm-quarters that are 
most likely or least likely to be affected by expectations management.  Specifically, we 
compare the observed sign of an earnings surprise with the sign of the earnings surprise 
that would have resulted in the absence of an interim forecast revision.  In the absence of 
an interim revision, the sign of the quarterly earnings surprise would be the same as the 
sign of the quarterly forecast error.  Observing a negative forecast error that turns into a 
positive earnings surprise is thus consistent with expectations management (talking-down 
expectations), as it must result from an excessive downward forecast revision.  Likewise, 
a zero or positive forecast error that turns into a negative earnings surprise (due to an 
excessive upward forecast revision) is inconsistent with expectations management.  In the 
absence of management intervention, the proportion of observations in which the interim 
forecast revision offsets the sign of the earnings surprise should be identical between 
cases with negative errors and cases with positive errors. 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 display the results from tests for a change in earnings 
expectations management in the Post-SOX period.  Consider the results in Table 2 first.  
The percentage of negative earnings surprises over the entire sample, 37.06 percent, is 
significantly smaller at the one percent significance level than the percentage of negative 
forecast errors, 44.70 percent.  This result is consistent with expectations management 
during the whole sample period whereby analyst earnings forecasts are dampened during 
the quarter so as to increase the likelihood of a positive earnings surprise. 
Examining the change in the frequency of negative earnings surprises across our 
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sample subperiods, we note a monotonic increase in the excess of negative earnings 
errors over negative earnings surprises in the first three subperiods: from 5.39 percent in 
the Early Pre-Scandal period, to 9.66 percent in the Late Pre-Scandal period, and to 12.41 
percent in the Scandal period.  However, this trend reverses in the Post-Scandal period, 
where the percentage of negative forecast errors declines, not increases, to 6.43 percent 
from 12.41 percent in the Scandal period.  Tests for statistical significance show that the 
differences in the excess of negative earnings errors over negative earnings surprises 
between each two consecutive subperiods (4.27 percent, 2.75 percent, and -5.98 percent), 
as well as between the Post-Scandal period and the Late Pre-Scandal period (-3.23 
percent), are all highly significant (significance level better than 1 percent).  This 
observed pattern in the excess of negative earnings errors over negative earnings 
surprises over our sample period is consistent with the hypothesis that earnings 
expectations management has become less prevalent in the Post-SOX period. 
The results in Table 3 corroborate our inference of declined expectations 
management in the Post-SOX period.  In this table, we determine the proportion of firm-
quarters with a negative forecast error that end with a positive or zero earnings surprise, 
and the proportion of firm-quarter observations with a positive or zero forecast error that 
end with a negative earnings surprise.  Observations that belong to the first group are 
more likely to result from expectations management than those in the second group.  To 
test for a decline in expectations management, we examine the difference between these 
two proportions.  Similar to the pattern observed in Table 2, the difference in proportions 
increases in the first three subperiods and decreases in the fourth.  More specifically, in 
the Late Pre-Scandal period 37.03 percent of the firm-quarters with a negative forecast 
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error ended with a positive earnings surprise (as a result of an excessive downward 
revision in earnings forecasts).  In contrast, only 8.50 percent of observations with a 
positive or zero forecast error ended with a negative earnings surprise (due to an 
excessively positive forecast revision that “spoiled” what otherwise would have been a 
positive earnings surprise).  The statistically significant difference between the two of 
28.53 percent, shown in the rightmost column, suggests the presence of expectations 
management in the Late Pre-Scandal period.  In the Post-SOX period forecast revisions 
are also more likely to turn a negative forecast error into a positive or zero surprise than 
to turn a positive or zero forecast error into a negative earnings surprise (33.06 percent 
vis-à-vis 10.01 percent).  However, the difference between the two is only 23.05 percent, 
lower by 5.47 percent than the 28.53 percent difference observed for the Late Pre-
Scandal period.  The last line of the rightmost column shows that this 5.47 percent 
decline is statistically significant at the one percent level.  Thus, similar to the results 
displayed in Table 2, the results in Table 3 also suggest a lower propensity to manage 
analysts’ expectations in the Post-SOX period.   
Recall that Koh et al. (2006) find the opposite result.  They find that expectations 
management increased, not decreased, in the Post-SOX period.  The difference in 
findings follows from our design choice to divide the Pre-Scandal period into two 
subperiods and to compare the Post-SOX period to the Latter rather than to the whole 
Pre-Scandal period.  We made this choice since, as discussed above, the Early and Late 
Pre-Scandal periods are inherently different (Bartov et al. 2002, Brown and Caylor 2005).  
To see this, note that the percentage of cases likely to be affected by expectations 
management has declined between the Late Pre-Scandal period and the Post-SOX period, 
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from 37.03 percent to 33.06 percent, consistent with a decline in expectations 
management.  However, this percentage has increased, not decreased, between the Early 
Pre-Scandal period (22.41 percent) and the Post-SOX period (33.06 percent).  Similarly, 
the percentage of cases less likely to be affected by expectations management has 
decreased from 13.72 to 10.01 percent, not increased, between the Early Pre-Scandal 
period and the Post-SOX period.  Given these differences between the Early and Late 
Pre-Scandal periods, combining the two together and then comparing them to the Post-
SOX period should lead to the inference that expectations management has increased in 
the Post-SOX period, rather than decreased.  This intuition is confirmed by the numbers 
displayed in the last two lines of the rightmost column.  While the difference in the 
proportions is significantly negative (-5.47 percent) when the Late Pre-Scandal period is 
compared to the Post-SOX period, it is significantly positive (4.44 percent) when the Pre-
Scandal period as a whole is compared to the Post-SOX period.  This analysis reconciles 
the contradictory findings of the current study and Koh el al. (2006), and highlights the 
importance of dividing the Pre-Scandal period into two subperiods to avoid 
contamination by low expectations management frequency in the Early Pre-Scandal 
period, where the use of analyst estimates as a benchmark for firm performance and the 
“expectations game,” were both at their infancy. 
 To further test for a decline in expectations management, we estimate the 
following regression model: 
εβββα ttttt POSTSCANPREIMEXP ++++= 3210 94__   (5) 
Where: 
EXP_M_It, the dependent variable, is the proportion of firm-quarters likely to be affected 
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by expectations management in quarter t; PRE94t is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of one if quarter t falls before the first quarter of 1994 (i.e., within the Early Pre-
Scandal period), and zero otherwise; SCANt is a dummy variable which takes the value 
of one if quarter t falls within the second quarter of 2001 through the second quarter of 
2002 (i.e., within the Scandal period), and zero otherwise; POSTt is a dummy variable 
which takes the value of one if the quarter t is after the third quarter of 2002 (i.e., within 
the Post-SOX period).  
 In terms of Equation (5), the intercept, α0, measures the proportion of firm-
quarters likely to be affected by expectations management in the Late Pre-Scandal period, 
and the slope coefficients, β1, β2, and β3, measure the difference in proportion between 
the Late Pre-Scandal period, and the Early Pre-Scandal period, the Scandal period, and 
the Post-SOX period, respectively.  The hypothesis of a decline in expectations 
management in the Post-SOX period relative to the Late Pre-Scandal period implies: β3 < 
0. 
The regression results are reported in Table 4.  Note that the dependent variable is 
measured in three alternative ways.  For consistency across tables, EXP_M_2 is similar 
to our definition of the percentage of cases likely to be affected by expectations 
management in the previous table (Table 3).  In addition, we consider two alternative 
measures, EXP_M_1, where the deflator is the total number of quarterly observations, 
rather than total number of quarterly observations with negative forecast errors, and 
EXP_M_3, which is defined as the percentage of firm-quarters with a zero or positive 
earnings surprise and a negative forecast revision, relative to total number of quarterly 
observations.  We estimate Equation (5) over our full sample period that spans the 19-
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year period, January 1987 through December 2005, and thus use 76 quarterly 
observations.  The results in Table 4 reinforce the results from the univariate results in 
Tables 2 and 3.  As hypothesized, β3, the coefficient on POST, is significantly negative 
for all three specifications of the dependent variable.  
In summary, the results in Tables 2, 3, and 4 are all consistent with earnings 
expectations being managed so as to result in positive earnings surprises in both the Late 
Pre-Scandal period and the Post-SOX period.  In particular, downward revisions are 
encouraged when, in their absence, the earnings surprise is expected to be negative, while 
upward revisions are discouraged if they might lead to a negative earnings surprise.  
More important, the results in all three tables are consistent with the hypothesis of a 
significant decline in expectations management in the Post-SOX period relative to the 
Late Pre-Scandal period. 
 
Changes in Frequency of Meeting/Beating Analyst Earnings Expectations 
 Before testing our second hypothesis, we examine changes in the frequency of 
meeting/beating analysts’ earnings expectations between the Late Pre-Scandal period and 
the Post-SOX period.  Based on findings of related research (e.g., Koh et al. 2006), we 
expect the frequency of meeting/beating analysts’ expectation to decline in the Post-SOX 
Period.  We test this prediction by using both univariate tests and regression tests.  The 
univariate tests concerns comparing the quarterly frequency of firms that meet or just 
beat analysts’ expectations across our four sample periods.  The results in Panel A of 
Table 5 show that the frequency of just meeting/beating increased between the Early and 
Late Pre-Scandal periods, from 18.12 percent to 26.81 percent, and that this increase of 
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8.68 percent is significant at the one percent significance level.  This result is consistent 
with findings in Bartov et al. (2002) and further highlights that the overall Pre-Scandal 
period (1987 - 2001) is not homogeneous and thus must be disaggregated into the two 
subperiods.  Turning to our prediction, there is a substantial decline in the frequency of 
just meeting/beating analysts’ earnings expectations between the Late Pre-Scandal period 
and the Post-SOX (Post-Scandal) period, from 26.81 percent to 21.63 percent, and this 
decline of 5.18 percent is significant at the one percent significance level.  
The regression tests for changes in the frequency of meeting/beating analysts’ 
earnings expectations between the four sample subperiods involve estimating the 
following model: 
Model: εββββ ttttt POSTSCANPREFREQ ++++= 3210 94          (6) 
Where: 
FREQt, the dependent variable, is the frequency of firms just meeting/beating analysts’ 
earnings expectations in quarter t; PRE94t is a dummy variable which takes the value of 
one if quarter t is before the first quarter of 1994 and zero otherwise; SCANt is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of one if quarter t falls within the second quarter of 2001 
and the second quarter of 2002, and zero otherwise; POSTt is a dummy variable, which 
takes the value of one if quarter t is after the third quarter of 2002, and zero otherwise. 
In terms of equation (6), the intercept, β0, measures the frequency of just 
meeting/beating analysts’ earnings expectations in the Late Pre-Scandal period, and the 
slope coefficients, β1, β2, and β3 measure the difference in frequency between the Late 
Pre-Scandal period, and the Early Pre-Scandal period, the Scandal period, and the Post-
SOX period, respectively.  Our hypothesis predicts a decline in the frequency between 
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the Late Pre-Scandal period and the Post-SOX period, i.e., β3 < 0.  We estimate Equation 
(6) over our full sample period, the 19 years spanning from January 1987 through 
December 2005, and thus use 76 quarterly observations.  The results displayed in Panel B 
of Table 5 are similar to those of the univariate tests reported in Panel A.  Specifically, as 
predicted, the coefficient on POST is negative, -0.051, and highly significant (t-statistic = 
-6.86) indicating a decline in the frequency of just meeting/beating analysts’ earnings 
expectations in the Post-SOX period relative to the Late Pre-Scandal period.  Like the 
univariate results, the regression results also show an increase in the frequency of just 
meeting/beating analysts’ expectations between the Early and Late Pre-Scandal periods 
and Late, indicated by a significantly negative coefficient (-0.087) on PRE94.  The only 
difference between the univariate and regression results is that the coefficient on SCAN 
is statistically insignificant, while the univariate tests indicated a significant decline in the 
frequency of just meeting/beating analysts’ expectations between the Late Pre-Scandal 
period and the Scandal period.  Overall, the results in Table 5 are consistent with the 
prediction that in the Post-SOX (Post-Scandal) period the frequency of just 
meeting/beating analysts’ expectations declined relative to the Late Pre-Scandal period. 
What may explain this observed decline?  Our second hypothesis predicts that the 
decline in the frequency of just meeting/beating analysts’ expectations mirrors a mix shift 
among the mechanisms used to meet or just beat analysts’ earnings expectations.  In the 
next section, we explicitly test this hypothesis by simultaneously considering three 
mechanisms: accrual earnings management, expectations management, and real earnings 
management. 
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Changes in the Blend among the Three Mechanisms to Meet/Beat Analysts’ 
Expectations 
 
 To test our second hypothesis, we estimate the following Logit model: 
εββ
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 Where: 
JUSTBEAT, the dependent variable, is a binary variable taking the value of one if the 
firm-quarter observation beats/meets analyst earnings expectations by a cent per share or 
less, and zero otherwise; PRE94t is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if 
quarter t falls before the first quarter of 1994 (i.e., within the Early Pre-Scandal period), 
and zero otherwise; SCANt is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if quarter t 
falls within the second quarter of 2001 through the second quarter of 2002 (i.e., within 
the Scandal period), and zero otherwise; POSTt is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of one if the quarter t is after the end of the second quarter of 2002 (i.e., in the Post-
SOX period); DA is discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones-model; 
EXP_M is a dummy variable taking the value of one if earnings surprise for the quarter is 
zero or positive and analyst earnings forecast revision is negative, and zero otherwise, 
where earnings surprise is the difference between the actual earnings number and the 
latest earnings forecast for the quarter,  and forecast revision is the difference between the 
last earnings forecast and the first earnings forecast for the quarter; REAL_EM is a proxy 
for real earnings management and is either: A_GAINA, A_PROD or A_SGA, where 
A_GAINA is abnormal gain on asset sales, measured as the difference between the actual 
gain on asset sales minus the industry-quarter median, A_PROD is abnormal production 
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costs, measured as the deviations from its predicted values from the corresponding 
industry-quarter regression: 
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and A_SGA is abnormal SG&A expense, measured as the deviation from its predicted 
value based on an industry-quarter regression: 
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R_M_PROXY is an aggregate real earnings management score, which is the sum of 
A_GAINA, A_PROD, and A_SGA.  Dummy variables for fiscal quarters Q1, Q2, Q3 are 
included (not tabulated) in each of the estimated models.  
In testing for a mix shift among the three mechanisms used to meet or just beat 
analysts’ earnings expectations between the Late Pre-Scandal period and Post-SOX 
period, the variables of interests in terms of Equation (7) are: β9, the coefficient on 
DA*POST, β12, the coefficient on EXP_M*POST, and β15, the coefficient on 
REAL_M*POST.  Our second hypothesis predicts: β9 < 0, β12 < 0, and β15 ≥ 0.  Reading 
across Table 6 we note three salient points.  First, the results reported in all four columns 
are similar indicating they are robust to the proxy used for real earnings management.  
Second, the coefficients on DA, EXP_M, and REAL_EM are all significantly positive.  
This suggests that in the Late Pre-Scandal period all three mechanisms, accrual earnings 
management, expectations management, and real earnings management were used to 
meet/beat analysts’ earnings expectations.  Third, as predicted β9, ranging from -1.271 to 
-1.400 depending on the proxy used for real earnings management, and β12, ranging from 
-0.161 to -0.168, are both statistically significantly negative, and β15 is insignificant.  
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These results suggest that relative to the Late Pre-Scandal period, in the Post-SOX period 
there have been a significant decrease in both accrual and expectations management, 
whereas real earnings management has not changed.   
 
Robustness Tests 
In this section we assess the reliability of our findings by considering two types of 
sensitivity tests.  First, a criticism of discretionary accruals models is their classification 
of nondiscretionary accruals as discretionary.  To address this concern, we assess the 
sensitivity of our findings in Table 6 after computing discretionary accruals using two 
alternative models.  First, previous research has shown that measures of unexpected 
accruals are more likely to be mis-specified for firms with extreme levels of performance.  
In particular, Dechow et al. (1995) and Kasznik (1999) document that estimated 
discretionary accruals are negative for firms with low earnings and positive for firms with 
high earnings.  To address this concern, we adjust the modified Jones model by including 
a measure of current operating performance, i.e., the current cash flows from operations 
excluding extraordinary items, as a control variable.  Our discretionary accrual model 
becomes: 
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A second alternative builds on the discussion in McNichols (2002), Dechow et al. 
(2003), and Larcker and Richardson (2003).  Since accruals are changes in working 
capital accounts, one would expect fast growing firms to have larger accruals (McNichols 
2002).  In line with this prediction, we include the book-to-market ratio (BM) as a proxy 
for expected growth in firm’s operations.  BM is measured as the ratio of the book value 
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of common equity to the market value of common equity:  
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The industry-quarter specific parameters obtained from equations (10) and (11), 
respectively, are used to estimate firm-quarter specific nondiscretionary accruals as a 
percent of lagged total assets, as in the first model specified in equation (1), which we 
used throughout the analysis.  The results of these sensitivity checks (not tabulated for 
parsimony) show that the results in Table 6 are robust to alternative measures of 
discretionary accruals. 
Our second sensitivity test assesses the effect of varying macro economic 
conditions on our findings.  Along the lines of Cohen et al. (2005), we replicate the 
results reported in Table 6 after adding two variables, GDP and IND_ROA, to control for 
varying real economic activity, which may affect earnings management and expectation 
management strategies.  While some of our measures of earnings management adjust for 
changes in real activity by construction (e.g., discretionary accruals), others do not (e.g., 
write-offs).  As a result, what might be classified as opportunistic earnings management 
may in fact be a consequence of changing economic conditions, either because the metric 
itself has not been adjusted for real activity, or because the adjustment was not adequate.  
In other words, discretionary accruals, write-offs, etc. may also reflect firms’ responses to 
and representations of changes in economic conditions.  If this were true, then changes in 
earnings management metrics will coincide with changes in measures of economic 
activity such as operating cash flows, revenues, prior stock returns, industry performance, 
changes in gross domestic product, etc.   
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 GDP is the percentage change in seasonally adjusted Gross Domestic Products over 
the previous quarter (a proxy of overall economic activity); and IND_ROAjq is the 
average return on assets of firm i’s two-digit industry (a proxy for industry-specific 
economic activity), computed after excluding the return on assets of firm i. Guenther and 
Young (2000) provide evidence of a high association between ROA and the economic 
growth rate, indicating that ROA reflects real economic activity in a timely manner.  We 
exclude the firm in calculating the average industry ROA in order to avoid any 
mechanical associations among the variables in the regression. 
Table 7 reports the results from this sensitivity test.  Reading across Table 7, we 
notice two salient points.  First, the two control variables, GDP and IND_ROA, are 
significant for all four specifications (the only exception is IND_ROA, which is only 
marginally significant in the rightmost column).  Second, the results are not sensitive to 
the inclusion of controls for macro economic effects.  Specifically, in testing for a mix 
shift among the three mechanisms used to meet or just beat analysts’ earnings 
expectations between the Late Pre-Scandal period and Post-SOX period, the variables of 
interests in terms of the Equation tested in Table 7 are: β11, the coefficient on DA*POST, 
β14, the coefficient on EXP_M*POST, and β17, the coefficient on REAL_M*POST.  Our 
second hypothesis predicts: β11 < 0, β14 < 0, and β17 ≥ 0.  The results in Table 7 support 
the first two predictions, consistent with the findings in Table 6.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 In this study we test for a change in the frequency of expectation management to 
meet/beat analysts’ earnings forecasts following the major accounting scandals of 2001-
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2002 and the regulatory reforms introduced by SOX.  We find evidence suggesting that 
expectation management has decreased significantly in the Post-SOX pPeriod compared 
to the late 1990’s suggesting that managers have reduced their reliance on such a 
mechanism to meet/beat analysts’ earnings expectations.  We also find that the frequency 
of meeting/beating analysts’ earnings expectation has declined in the Post-SOX period.   
 Next, we examine what might explain the observed decline in the tendency to 
meet/beat expectations.  We acknowledge that managers can simultaneously use a mix of 
actions to meet/beat analysts’ earnings expectations, namely accruals management, 
expectation management, and real earnings management.  In fact, one feature underlying 
our research design that distinguishes our work from related studies is our use of a 
specification that considers simultaneously these three mechanisms.  Our results suggest 
that while all three mechanisms are used to meet/beat earnings expectations, relative to 
the Late-Pre-Scandal period, in the Post-SOX period there has been a significant decline 
both in accruals management and expectations management, whereas real earnings 
management has not changed. 
 Our study makes an important contribution to the extant literature.  We not only 
document that the frequency to meet/beat analysts’ earnings expectations has diminished 
in the Post-SOX period, but also explain this finding by considering simultaneously all 
three mechanisms used to meet or beat analysts’ expectations.  We find that accrual 
earnings management and expectations management declined while real earnings 
management remained unchanged.  By documenting this change in the relative use of the 
three mechanisms our results imply that in the Post-SOX period investors and regulators 
should pay more attention to real earnings management than in the Pre-SOX Period. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
TIMELINE OF SAMPLE SUBPERIODS ANALYZED 
 
 
 
      
 
    
 
 
 
Notes to Figure 1: The sample period begins in January 1987 and ends in December 2005. 
 
     Early Pre-Scandal                  Late Pre-Scandal                Scandal          Post-Scandal 
 
              Quarter 2, 2001            Quarter 2, 2002           Quarter 4, 2005      Quarter 1, 1987                          Quarter 4, 1993 
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics of Sample Firms 
(1987 – 2005) 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics, I/B/E/S Sample 
 N Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75% 
NEG_SURP 245,113 0.346 0.475 0 0.475 1 
NEG_FE 245,113 0.429 0.494 0 0 1.000 
REV 245,113 -0.112 33.003 -0.020 0 0.005 
MBE 245,113 0.653 0.476 0 1.000 1.000 
JUSTBEAT 245,113 0.236 0.424 0 0 0 
MKTVL 245,113 2851.44 24763.49 125.164 395.666 1389.26 
 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics, Merged Sample (I/B/E/S and COMPUSTAT) 
 N Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75% 
ACCRUALS 84,754 -0.015 0.061 -0.034 -0.013 0.008 
DA 84,754 0.004 0.048 -0.006 0.008 0.023 
ABS_DA 84,754 0.027 0.040 0.007 0.016 0.033 
C_INV 84,754 0.004 0.031 -0.003 0 0.009 
GAINA 84,754 0.001 0.016 0 0 0 
MKTVL 84,754 2965.06 15284.13 118.33 372.49 1284.50 
SGA_A 84,754 0.084 0.069 0.036 0.069 0.116 
 
Notes to Table 1: 
NEG_SURP is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if earnings surprise for the quarter is 
negative, and zero otherwise. 
NEG_FE is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if forecast error is negative, and zero otherwise. 
REV is forecast revision defined as the difference between the last earnings forecast and the first earnings 
forecast for the quarter, Flatest - Fearliest. 
MBE is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm meets and/or beats analysts’ 
expectations (SURP≥0), and zero otherwise. 
JUSTBEAT is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm beats analysts’ expectations by a 
cent per share or less ($0.00 ≤EPS-Flatest ≤ $0.01), and zero otherwise. 
MKTVL is the market value of equity calculated as the share price times the number of shares outstanding. 
ACCRUALS are defined as the difference between income before extraordinary items and cash flows from 
operations, adjusted for extraordinary items and discontinued operations. 
DA is discretionary accruals, calculated using the modified Jones model. 
ABS_DA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
C_INV is the change in inventory, scaled by lagged total assets. 
GAINA is the gain on sale of assets, scaled by lagged total assets. 
SGA_A are SG&A expenses scaled by lagged total assets. 
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 TABLE 2 
Relative frequency of negative forecast errors and negative earnings surprises  
(1987 - 2005) 
 
  
Percentage of 
negative earnings 
surprises 
(%) 
 
Percentage of 
negative forecast 
errors 
(%) 
Excess of negative 
earnings errors 
over negative 
surprise cases 
(%) 
 (A) (B) (C) = (B) - (A) 
All years 37.06 44.70 7.64* 
By Sub-periods    
1987:Q1 – 1993:Q4 
(1) 
48.11 53.50 5.39* 
1994:Q1 – 2001:Q2 
(2) 
31.10 40.76 9.66* 
2001:Q3 - 2002:Q2 
(3) 
26.63 39.04 12.41* 
2002:Q3 – 2005:Q4 
(4) 
30.72 37.15 6.43* 
    
Differences    
(2) – (1) -17.01 -12.74* 4.27* 
(3) – (2) -4.47* -1.72** 2.75* 
(4) – (3) 4.09* -1.89* -5.98* 
(4) – (2) -0.37 -3.61* -3.23* 
 
Notes to Table 2: 
* Significant at the 1% level, using the test of proportions; ** Significant at the 5% level, using the test of 
proportions.  The sample consists of 245,113 firm-quarter observations for 1987-2005. 
Earnings surprise is the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the quarter,  
EPS - Flatest.  
Forecast error is the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the quarter,  
EPS - Fearliest.  
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TABLE 3 
Expectation Management: frequency of selected expectations paths, by period  
(1987 - 2005) 
 
 Cases likely to be 
affected by 
expectations 
management  
(%) 
Cases less likely 
to be affected by 
expectations 
management 
 (%) 
 
 
Difference in 
proportions 
(%) 
    
All years 31.18 10.68 20.50* 
    
By Subperiod    
1987:Q1 – 1993:Q4 
(1) 
22.41 13.72 8.69* 
1994:Q1 – 2001:Q2 
(2) 
37.03 8.50 28.53* 
2001:Q3 - 2002:Q2 
(3) 
42.07 8.16 33.91* 
2002:Q3 – 2005:Q4 
(4) 
33.06 10.01 23.05* 
    
Differences    
(2) – (1) 14.62* -5.22* 19.84* 
(3) – (2) 5.04* -0.34 5.38* 
(4) – (3) -9.01* 1.85** -10.86* 
(4) – (2) -3.96* 1.51** -5.47* 
(4) – (1+2) 3.34* 1.10** 4.44* 
 
Notes to Table 3: 
* Significant at the 1% level, using the test of proportions; ** Significant at the 5% level, using the test of 
proportions.  The sample consists of 245,113 firm-quarter observations for 1987 - 2005. 
Cases likely to be affected by expectation management are cases where the forecast revision turns a 
negative forecast error into a positive or zero earnings surprise, scaled by all cases with a negative forecast 
error. 
Cases less likely to be affected by expectation management are cases where the forecast revision turns a 
positive or zero forecast error into a negative earnings surprise, scaled by all cases with a positive or zero-
forecast error. 
The forecast revision is the difference between the latest forecast and the earlier forecast for the quarter, 
Flatest - Fearliest.  
The earnings surprise is the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the period, 
EPS - Flatest.  
The forecast error is the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the quarter,  
EPS - Fearliest. 
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TABLE 4 
Temporal Analysis of Expectations Management 
(1987 - 2005) 
 
Model: εβββα ttttt POSTSCANPREIMEXP ++++= 3210 94__  
      
  EXP_M_1 
 
EXP_M_2 
 
EXP_M_3 
 
Intercept 0.148 
(35.62) 
0.366 
(45.89) 
0.269 
(65.27) 
 
PRE94 -0.028 
(-4.78) 
-0.142 
(-12.49) 
-0.055 
(-9.39) 
 
SCAN 0.018 
(1.75) 
0.067 
(3.21) 
0.054 
(5.07) 
 
POST -0.024 
(-3.31) 
-0.035 
(-2.56) 
-0.020 
(-2.87) 
    
N (Quarters) 76 76 76 
Adj. R2 0.58 0.86 0.82 
 
Notes to Table 4: 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
EXP_M1 is the percentage of firm-quarters with a zero or positive earnings surprise and a negative forecast 
error, relative to total number of quarterly observations. 
EXP_M2 is the percentage of firm-quarters with a zero or positive earnings surprise and a negative forecast 
error, relative to total number of quarterly observations with negative forecast errors. 
EXP_M3 is the percentage of firm-quarters with a zero or positive earnings surprise and a negative forecast 
revision, relative to total number of quarterly observations. 
Earnings surprise is the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the quarter,  
EPS - Flatest.  
Forecast error is the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the quarter,  
EPS - Fearliest  
Forecast revision is the difference between the last earnings forecast and the first earnings forecast for the 
quarter, Flatest - Fearliest. 
PRE94 is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the observation is before the first quarter of 
1994, and zero otherwise. 
SCAN is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the observation falls within the period, third 
quarter of 2001 through the second quarter of 2002, and zero otherwise.  
POST is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the observation is after the end of the second 
quarter of 2002, and zero otherwise. 
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TABLE 5 
Temporal Analysis of Frequency of Firms Beating Analyst 
Expectations by One Cent Per Share or Less 
(1987 - 2005) 
 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis of Frequencies                     
 1987:Q1-
1993:Q4 
(%) 
(A) 
1994:Q1-
2001:Q1 
(%) 
(B) 
2001:Q2-
2002:Q2  
(%) 
(C) 
2002:Q3-
2005:Q4 
(%) 
(D) 
Frequency of Firms 
Just Meet/Beat  
 
18.12 
 
26.81 
 
25.22 
 
21.63 
 
Differences 
 
    
(B) – (A) 8.69%*    
(C) – (B) -1.59%*    
(D) – (C) -3.59%*    
(D) – (B)  -5.18%*    
 
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis of the Frequencies 
 
Model: εββββ ttttt POSTSCANPREFREQ ++++= 3210 94  
 
Variable Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept 0.268 
(62.05) 
 
PRE94 -0.087 
(-14.11) 
 
SCAN -0.041 
(-1.26) 
 
POST -0.051 
(-6.86) 
 
N (Quarters) 76 
Adj. R2 0.86 
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Notes to Table 5: 
*Significant at the 1% level, using the test of proportions. 
FREQ is the frequency of firms beating analysts’ expectations by a cent per share or less, i.e.,  
$0.00 ≤ EPS - Flatest ≤ $0.01 
PRE94 is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the observation is before the first quarter of 
1994, and zero otherwise. 
SCAN is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the observation falls within the third quarter of 
2001 through the second quarter of 2002, and zero otherwise.  
POST is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the observation is after the end of the second 
quarter of 2002, and zero otherwise. 
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TABLE 6 
Logit Analysis of firms that Just Meet/Beat Analyst Expectations 
(1987 - 2005) 
 
)*_*_
94*_*_*_
94*_**94*_
_94()1(Pr
14 15
1311 12
108 976
543210
εββ
βββ
βββββ
βββββα
ititit
ititit
ititititit
itititititit
POSTEMREALSCANEMREAL
PREEMREALPOSTMEXPSCANMEXP
PREMEXPPOSTDASCANDAPREDAEMREAL
MEXPDAPOSTSCANPREFJUSTBEATob
+++
+++
+++++
++++++==
 
Variable  A_GAINA A_PROD A_SGA R_M_PROXY 
Intercept  -0.662 
(<0.0001) 
-0.662 
(<0.0001) 
-0.657 
(<0.0001) 
-0.658 
(<0.0001) 
PRE94  -0.334 
(0.011) 
-0.347 
(<0.0001) 
-0.369 
(0.016) 
-0.365 
(<0.0001) 
SCAN  0.052 
(0.185) 
0.056 
(0.145) 
0.077 
(0.056) 
0.063 
(0.131) 
POST  0.020 
(0.526) 
0.023 
(0.456) 
0.011 
(0.734) 
0.012 
(0.722) 
DA  2.114 
(<0.0001) 
2.068 
(<0.0001) 
2.051 
(<0.0001) 
2.046 
(<0.0001) 
EXP_M  0.279 
(<0.0001) 
0.278 
(<0.0001) 
0.283 
(<0.0001) 
0.284 
(<0.0001) 
REAL_EM  3.278 
(<0.0001) 
0.411 
(0.004) 
0.114 
(0.216) 
0.234 
(<0.0001) 
DA*PRE94  4.862 
(<0.0001) 
4.608 
(<0.0001) 
5.051 
(<0.0001) 
4.944 
(<0.0001) 
DA*SCAN  -0.838 
(0.095) 
-0.997 
(0.041) 
-0.864 
(0.005) 
-0.999 
(0.013) 
DA*POST  -1.400 
(0.0199) 
-1.392 
(0.02) 
-1.397 
(0.0090 
-1.271 
(0.021) 
EXP_M*PRE94  -0.393 
(<0.0001) 
-0.400 
(<0.0001) 
-0.387 
(<0.0001) 
-0.386 
(<0.0001) 
EXP_M*SCAN  -0.214 
(0.002) 
-0.217 
(0.001) 
-0.204 
(0.004) 
-0.194 
(0.008) 
EXP_M*POST  -0.165 
(0.004) 
-0.161 
(0.005) 
-0.168 
(0.005) 
-0.165 
(0.006) 
REAL_EM*PRE94  4.919 
(0.008) 
0.192 
(0.559) 
1.236 
(<0.0001)) 
0.831 
(<0.0001) 
REAL_EM*SCAN  -0.656 
(0.502) 
0.700 
(0.349) 
-0.223 
(0.641) 
-0.062 
(0.879) 
REAL_EM*POST  4.126 
(0.397) 
0.127 
(0.912) 
0.538 
(0.337) 
0.388 
(0.442) 
      
No. of Observations  84,754 84,754 76,588 76,588 
Log-Likelihood Ratio  2164.04 2216.94 2042.74 1976.64 
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Notes to Table 6: 
P-values are reported in parentheses.  
JUSTBEAT, the dependent variable is a binary variable taking the value of one if the firm-quarter 
observation beat/meet analysts’ expectations by a cent per share or less ($0.00 ≤EPS-Flatest ≤ $0.01). 
PRE94 is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the observation is before the first quarter of 
1994, and zero otherwise. 
SCAN is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the observation falls within the third quarter of 
2001 through the second quarter of 2002, and zero otherwise.  
POST is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the observation is after the end of the second 
quarter of 2002, and zero otherwise. 
DA is defined as discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones-model. 
EXP_M is a dummy variable taking the value of one if earnings surprise for the quarter is zero or positive 
and analysts’ forecast revision is negative.   
Earnings surprise is the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the quarter, EPS-
Flatest.  
Forecast error is the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the quarter, EPS-
Fearliest  
Forecast revision is the difference between the last earnings forecast and the first earnings forecast for the 
quarter, Flatest - Fearliest. 
REAL_EM is a proxy for real earnings management activities and is either: A_GAINA, A_PROD or 
A_SGA. 
A_GAINA is defined as abnormal gain on asset sales, which is the difference between the actual gain on 
sale minus the industry-quarter median. 
A_PROD is abnormal production costs, measured as the deviations from the predicted values from the 
corresponding industry-quarter regression: 
 
εββαδ jq
jq
jq
jq
jq
jq
jq
jq
jq
Asset
SALES
Asset
Sales
AssetAsset
PROD ++Δ++=
−−−− 1
2
1
1
1
0
1
)(1  
 
A_SGA is abnormal Sales, General and Admin. expense measured as deviations from the predicted values 
from the corresponding industry-quarter regression: 
 
εββαδ jq
jq
jq
jq
jq
jq
jq
jq
jq
Asset
SALES
Asset
Sales
AssetAsset
SGA ++Δ++=
−−−− 1
2
1
1
1
0
1
)(1  
 
R_M_PROXY is the aggregate real earnings manipulation score, which is the sum of A_GAINA, 
A_PROD, and A_SGA. 
 
Dummy variables for fiscal quarters Q1, Q2, Q3 are included (not tabulated) in each of the estimated 
models.  
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TABLE 7 
Logit Analysis of firms that Just Meet/Beat Analyst Expectations: Controlling for 
Varying Economic Activities, (1987 - 2005) 
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Variable  A_GAINA A_PROD A_SGA R_M_PROXY 
Intercept  -1.086 
(<0.0001) 
-1.088 
(<0.0001) 
-1.095 
(<0.0001) 
-1.094 
(<0.0001) 
PRE94  -0.357 
(<0.0001) 
-0.359 
(<0.0001) 
-0.372 
(<0.0001) 
-0.371 
(<0.0001) 
SCAN  0.446 
(<0.0001) 
0.458 
(<0.0001) 
0.471 
(<0.0001) 
0.455 
(<0.0001) 
POST  0.421 
(<0.0001) 
0.427 
  (<0.0001) 
0.425 
(<0.0001) 
0.425 
(<0.0001) 
GDP 
 
 0.013 
(<0.0001) 
0.013 
(<0.0001) 
0.013 
(<0.0001) 
0.013 
(<0.0001) 
IND_ROA 
 
 0.994 
(<0.0001) 
1.092 
(<0.0001) 
0.136 
(<0.0001) 
0.167 
(0.064) 
DA  7.241 
(<0.0001) 
6.987 
(<0.0001) 
7.401 
(<0.0001) 
7.234 
(<0.0001) 
EXP_M  0.657 
(<0.0001) 
0.665 
(<0.0001) 
0.655 
(<0.0001) 
0.675 
(<0.0001) 
REAL_EM  3.639 
(<0.0001) 
0.942 
(0.004) 
1.501 
(<0.0001) 
1.292 
(<0.0001) 
DA*PRE94  5.049 
(<0.0001) 
6.351 
(<0.0001) 
5.241 
(<0.0001) 
4.944 
(<0.0001) 
DA*SCAN  -5.974 
(0.095) 
-5.924 
(<0.0001) 
-6.223 
(<0.0001) 
-6.452 
(<0.0001) 
DA*POST  -6.561 
(0.0199) 
-6.352 
(<0.0001) 
-6.752 
(<0.0001) 
-6.191 
(<0.0001) 
EXP_M*PRE94  -0.354 
(<0.0001) 
-0.362 
(<0.0001) 
-0.351 
(<0.0001) 
-0.386 
(<0.0001) 
EXP_M*SCAN  -0.593 
(0.002) 
-0.604 
(<0.0001) 
-0.578 
(<0.0001) 
-0.568 
(<0.0001) 
EXP_M*POST  -0.544 
(0.004) 
-0.544 
(<0.0001) 
-0.538 
(<0.0001) 
-0.535 
(<0.0001) 
REAL_EM*PRE94  0.135 
(0.772) 
-0.542 
(0.132) 
-1.351 
(<0.0001) 
-1.034 
(<0.0001) 
REAL_EM*SCAN  -0.734 
(0.465) 
0.184 
(0.818) 
-1.612 
(<0.0001) 
-1.123 
(0.014) 
REAL_EM*POST  3.835 
(0.436) 
-0.403 
(0.733) 
-0.866 
(0.159) 
-0.685 
(0.201) 
      
No. of Observations  84,754 84,754 76,588 76,588 
Log-Likelihood Ratio  2118.58 2180.55 1996.72 1931.61 
 41
Notes to Table 7: 
P-values are reported in parentheses.  
JUSTBEAT, the dependent variable is a binary variable taking the value of one if the firm-quarter 
observation beat/meet analysts’ expectations by a cent per share or less ($0.00 ≤EPS-Flatest ≤ $0.01). 
PRE94 is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the observation is before the first quarter of 
1994, and zero otherwise. 
SCAN is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the observation falls within the third quarter of 
2001 through the second quarter of 2002, and zero otherwise.  
POST is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the observation is after the end of the second 
quarter of 2002, and zero otherwise. 
GDP is percentage change in seasonally adjusted GDP over the previous quarter.  
IND_ROA is the industry average ROA for the quarter, calculated for each two-digit SIC code. 
DA is defined as discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones-model. 
EXP_M is a dummy variable taking the value of one if earnings surprise for the quarter is zero or positive 
and analysts’ forecast revision is negative.   
Earnings surprise is the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the quarter, EPS-
Flatest.  
Forecast error is the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the quarter, EPS-
Fearliest  
Forecast revision is the difference between the last earnings forecast and the first earnings forecast for the 
quarter, Flatest - Fearliest. 
REAL_EM is a proxy for real earnings management activities and is either: A_GAINA, A_PROD or 
A_SGA. 
A_GAINA is defined as abnormal gain on asset sales, which is the difference between the actual gain on 
sale minus the industry-quarter median. 
A_PROD is abnormal production costs, measured as the deviations from the predicted values from the 
corresponding industry-quarter regression: 
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A_SGA is abnormal Sales, General and Admin. expense measured as deviations from the predicted values 
from the corresponding industry-quarter regression: 
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R_M_PROXY is the aggregate real earnings manipulation score, which is the sum of A_GAINA, 
A_PROD, and A_SGA. 
 
Dummy variables for fiscal quarters Q1, Q2, Q3 are included (not tabulated) in each of the estimated 
models.  
 
